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Business sustainability of corporations a hundred years old, is not a regular occurrence in Africa. A 
qualitative historical study of the development of an insurance company succeeding on the trajectory 
of adapting to challenging context constitutes the core of this study. The historical analysis illustrates 
the role of social context, international political economy and management agency in negotiating a 
successful company to overcome contextual constraints. The South African Life Assurance Company 
(Sanlam) arrived at the end of the Second World War in 1945 with a basic business strategy focusing on 
sustaining its growth since 1918. Dynamic contextual changes mandated strategic management 
changes in the business focus, empowerment strategy and strategic vision of the company. This article 
explains how management responded to change, relying on international management practices to 
secure a century of African business success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Few companies survive simultaneous fundamental socio-
political and global industry overhaul. This article 
explores the management agency in Sanlam for 
sustainability between a stable conservative business 
environment and radical contextual changes since the 
end of World War II (WWII). Using international 
management theory (Bateman and Snell, 2009; Chandler, 
1992; Kelley et al., 2006; Senge, 1990) and practice 
during the post-war era in a case study, this article 
assesses the performance of Sanlam, management 
actions and the outcome within this context of growth, 
international adversity and domestic instability 
Sanlam was established in 1918 as a company seeking 
to  take  insurance  to  the  uninsured  and   impoverished 
Afrikaans community in South Africa. Despite marketing 
all its insurance products inclusively to all South Africans, 
Sanlam was considered to be an insurance company for 
Afrikaans people. The relevance of the history of Sanlam 
for business sustainability in Africa, is that a marginalised 
segment of society achieved economic empowerment 
through systematic business development commencing 
with life insurance. After the 1940s Sanlam also invested 
in other Afrikaans business enterprises and by the 1960s 
Afrikaners has established a presence in the 
manufacturing industry, in mining, banking and the retail 
sector (Giliomee, 2003; Davenport and Saunders, 2000). 
A dearth of studies on post-1945 African business 
development, especially during the period of
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decolonisation, African nationalism and the quest for self-
determination in Africa, opens an opportunity to explain 
the success factors supporting Sanlam during those 
formative years in the history of Africa. A growing number 
of businesses in Africa that commenced operations since 
the 1990s, stand to benefit from the case study on the 
strategic role of change management in directing an 
enterprise through challenging circumstances towards 
sustainability. 
 
 
Problem statement 
 
Since the end of WWII in 1945, the external environment 
of conducting business and management in Africa and 
South Africa, changed fundamentally and dynamically. 
For any organisation to survive this change and sustain 
its business in the long run, management vision, strategy 
and practices, as these unfold in the organisation, offer 
insight into a company‟s ability to sustain itself. Change 
management is fundamental in understanding the 
sustainability strategy of any organisation. This article 
seeks to explain how Sanlam, a long-term insurance 
company in South Africa, negotiated fundamental market 
overhaul to secure the longevity of the company into the 
twenty-first century. What role did management perform 
in securing company survival? 
The research gap is not that Sanlam was the only life 
insurance company to survive for a hundred years in 
South Africa, the SA Mutual turned a hundred years old 
already in 1945. The research gap is that Sanlam was an 
Afrikaans oriented company that allowed research into its 
archives, to establish how management negotiated the 
changed context to sustain the company. The second 
element of the research gap is to establish how, despite 
international isolation, management tapped into 
international management theory and best practice, to 
transform the unfocussed conglomerate into an inclusive 
focussed financial services operation in Africa. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A qualitative research methodology is used. The study is 
based on in-depth and critical qualitative source analysis 
of primary documents as well as secondary literature to 
understand management strategy, vision and practices 
between 1945 and 2013. A case study of the 
development of Sanlam between 1945 and 2013 was 
undertaken, exploring the management practices and 
implementation of change management during the entire 
period.  
The final assessment is based on an analysis of the 
management practices of Sanlam and how it was applied 
within the organisation, as well as management‟s 
understanding and application of change management 
and how it contributed to sustainability of the organisation.   
 
 
 
 
The objective of the study is to analyse the case of 
Sanlam between 1945 and 2013 in the complex South 
African context, to determine how sustainability was 
achieved. The focus is on the crucial role of 
management. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Management theory-culture and strategy  
 
Theories of management in the post-war era 
 
After WWII the business environment of insurance 
companies internationally as well as in South Africa, 
became increasingly turbulent and complex. Management 
had to understand the complex variables in the internal 
and external environment. The primary focus was no 
longer on the organisation only. Changes in the external 
environment had a direct and indirect impact on business 
sustainability. This interrelationship between the 
environment and the organisation gave rise to the 
systems approach to management as well as other 
dynamic contemporary approaches such as the 
contingency approach, the learning organisation, re-
engineering and total quality management. This complex 
management environment mandated exceptional 
managerial capabilities. 
The Cold War era of1946 to 1989, is a very important 
period in the development of management theory. During 
the late 1940s through to the 1960s distinct schools of 
management emerged. These included the human 
relations theory, the equilibrium theory and systems 
theory (Kelley et al., 2006). The systems approach to 
management was developed in the 1950s and 
compensated for the main limitations of the classical 
approaches. The limitations of the classic management 
approach were that the relationship between the 
organisation and its external environment was ignored 
and that the focus on specific aspects of the organisation 
was at the expense of other considerations. A lack of an 
integrated perspective hampered organisational 
sustainability. According to Smit et al. (2007), the 
systems approach „views an organisation as a group of 
interrelated parts with a single purpose: to remain in 
balance (equilibrium)‟. Any changes in one part influences 
other parts and leads to imbalance. 
In response to this limitation, the contingency approach 
to management offered the systems approach to 
organisational management. This approach recognises 
that there is no single best management practice. 
Therefore management should integrate the most 
appropriate management techniques and principles from 
different management theories to contend with complex 
business contexts. Contingencies such as the external 
environment, the capabilities of the organisation, the 
managers and the technologies used by the  organisation  
 
 
 
 
assists managers in grasping complex contexts and 
choose appropriate business strategies. (Smit et al., 
2007).  
The classic approaches to management continue to 
underpin fundamental management and organisational 
behaviour up to today. The human relations perspective 
in management remains an influential management  
dimension (Smit et al., 2007). The Human Relations 
theory aims at understanding how psychological and 
social processes interact in the work environment to 
affect performance. This theory was the first to 
emphasise informal work relationships and worker 
satisfaction. This approach owes much to other schools 
of thought such as the scientific management and 
administrative management approaches which originated 
from the classical management theory (Bateman and 
Snell, 2009). 
The development in management theory, described 
earlier, shaped and guided management in organisations 
since 1945 as the international business environment 
became increasingly global. Complexity and uncertainty 
characterised the context of business. Management had 
to contend with a growing need for competitiveness, 
quality and value creation. Management had to develop a 
systematic understanding of the internal and external 
environment of the organisation and deal with situations 
and contingencies within a complex context. This 
approach assisted organisations in securing a sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
Management capabilities during global volatility 
 
In a volatile global world of work, adaptive managerial 
capabilities are critical towards organisational competitive 
advantage and the ability to devise strategies to exploit 
competitive advantages. Capability deployment pre-
empts emerging opportunities and mitigates the 
disadvantages of foreignness (Luo, 2000).  
According to Chandler (1993) the evolution of modern 
management approaches and an organisation‟s 
capabilities developed within the organisation, were 
fundamental in shaping economic growth and competitive 
strength of modern industrial nations. After World War II 
production processes became more capital-intensive and 
cost advantages were utilised through economies of 
scale. The Japanese, for example, acquired new facilities 
and developed skills and capabilities within their 
organisations. The rapidly growing local markets led to 
global expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. Organisational 
capabilities distinguished the successful nation from other 
global contenders, generating economic growth and 
industrial strength.  
After World War II organisational capabilities were 
driven by business organisation competition and national 
aspirations. The learned capabilities resulted from 
problem solving and acquiring knowledge from an 
understanding    of    the    external     environment     and  
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stakeholders of the organisation. Applying the learning 
organisation approach these capabilities were 
established, with constant learning on various levels, 
including between workers and managers. The creation, 
maintenance and expansion of these capabilities gave 
some organisations a competitive advantage over others 
in global markets (Chandler, 1992). 
Penrose cited in Augier and Teece (2007) states that 
„the unused capabilities of management, coupled with the 
intangibility of certain resources‟, enables diversification 
in an organisation. Penrose argues that organisations are 
able to grow as managerial capability is freed up for new 
applications through managerial learning. This is also 
referred to as the dynamic capabilities approach. This 
approach provides a framework for organisations on how 
to develop a sustainable competitive advantage. Dynamic 
capabilities also refer to the capacity of an organisation to 
shape, re-shape, configure and re-configure its asset 
base in such a way to enable a response to a changing 
environment.  
Teece (2012) builds on this concept of dynamic 
capabilities by stating that these capabilities are based on 
the skills and knowledge of one or a few executives 
rather than on organisational routines. Dynamic 
capabilities are higher level competences that determine 
the organisation‟s ability to integrate and build the 
competences to address a rapidly changing business 
environment. These capabilities have grown in 
importance over time due to its strategic nature as an 
enabler of value creation and competitive advantage. 
Capabilities are built on individual skills as well as 
collective learning. The longer an organisation has been 
in existence and the larger its size, the less its 
capabilities depend on specific individuals. Dynamic 
capabilities on an enterprise level consist of more than 
routines. The capabilities lead to identification, 
prioritisation and selection of appropriate projects in an 
organisation where routines identify how the projects are 
run. The study of corporate histories can lead to 
understanding the origins of capabilities (Teece, 2012).  
 
 
Change management globally and locally 
 
One way of understanding organisational change is 
through the analysis of how the organisational routines 
change. Becker et al. (2005) describe routines as „the 
basic components of organisational behaviour and the 
repository of organisational capabilities‟. Change of 
routines is in most cases instigated by management. The 
capability of an organisation to compete is dependent on 
introducing new products and services and improving 
their processes. This requires continuous change in 
routines.  
In the complex and turbulent environment in which 
organisations have to compete successfully to survive, 
managing change is one of the most difficult challenges 
facing  management.  Change  is  often  unexpected  and  
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that adds to the complexity of managing that change. 
Change is closely related to the culture of an organisation 
and can therefore change the complete nature of the 
organisation. Organisations are made up of people and 
that also increases the complexity of dealing with change, 
since change is human action and impacts on the lives of 
people. Organisational development has also gained 
traction as a popular approach to organisation studies, 
since it incorporates an on-going planned effort by 
managers and leaders to manage change as a means of 
improving organisational performance (Smit et al., 2007).  
Change management and strategic planning or thinking 
go hand-in-hand in most organisations. The nature of 
strategic planning has also changed as it is conducted 
within a context of uncertainty. The timeframe of planning 
shortens continuously. With every change to the strategy 
of the organisation, it implies organisational development 
interventions to assist the people of the organisation to 
understand and deal with the change implied by the 
strategy. 
„Environmental changes drive strategy and strategic 
planning and these in turn drive organisational change‟ 
(Viljoen, 2015). The nature of change and the aim to 
ensure sustainable success in the context of change, 
mandates an analysis of change management in an 
integrated and holistic context. This article will assess 
change within the context of complex domestic conditions 
in South Africa. The most appropriate model to 
understand the success of Sanlam in a fundamentally 
changed context, is the model of systemic change. This 
ties back to the systemic management approach. „The 
interplay between the changing external environment and 
the internal world always leads to continuous changes in 
both worlds‟ (Viljoen, 2015).  
 
 
THE CASE OF SANLAM  
 
The life office in the changing environment 
 
In 1945 Sanlam was only the fourth-largest life office by 
premium income, but moved into the second position 
since 1948. The financial services market became more 
competitive, specialised and diversified. In this context 
management directed Sanlam into a diversified 
operational environment as the founding generation of 
managers made way for the second generation of 
managers. Gys de Villiers and Tinie Louw, joint General 
Managers, both retired in 1946. Louw stayed on as 
Managing Director of Sanlam until December 1949, while 
AD Wassenaar succeeded De Villiers as General 
Manager in October 1948, a position he held until the end 
of 1965, when the title of the senior manager changed 
from General Manager to Managing Director. Wassenaar 
held this position until 1969, when he was succeeded by 
PJF (Pepler) Scholtz in March 1969 until the end of April 
1978. Scholtz was the Managing Director until 1978.  
 
 
 
 
When Wassenaar stepped down as Managing Director, 
he then joined the Board, from which he retired at the age 
of 80, bringing to an end a career of 60 years in Sanlam. 
FJ (Fred) du Plessis succeeded Scholtz in May 1978 and 
served as Managing Director of Sanlam until April 1985. 
Up to 1978 the top managerial positions in Sanlam were 
occupied by men who had progressed up the company 
ladder. 
The generation of founding members worked in a 
close-knit managerial team under Willie Hofmeyr as 
Chairman of Sanlam. When Hofmeyr suddenly passed 
away in 1953, Charlie Louw succeeded him as Chairman 
until 1966. Louw only retired at the age of 91, being a 
director for 48 years. Hofmeyr was a symbol of Afrikaner 
perseverance and drive, and conducted his duties as 
chairman in an „executive‟ manner, despite not being an 
„executive chairman‟. Inward-looking Afrikaner control 
was illustrated by Wassenaar‟s ascendancy to the 
position of Chairman of the Sanlam board in January 
1967. He retired as Managing Director only in 1969. Then 
he remained on the Board until he turned 75 in 
September 1982. Fred du Plessis succeeded Wassenaar 
as Chairman in 1982. In 1982, Du Plessis was made 
Executive Chairman of Sanlam and assumed the duties 
of Group Chief Executive in 1985, positions he occupied 
until his death in 1989. Fred du Plessis was the first non-
Sanlam employee to assume a managerial position in the 
company. 
In a conservative management structure with managers 
emerging from the formative years‟ paradigm, Sanlam 
was successful in growing the company along the 
existing industry trajectory. In the business of life 
assurance, the strategy was growth and product 
diversification. In one respect, Sanlam diverted from 
growth strategies of long-term insurance companies 
globally. Sanlam, as the company targeting the uninsured 
market of Afrikaans people in South Africa, engaged in 
other Afrikaner economic empowerment strategies. The 
leadership in Sanlam joined other Afrikaner business, 
academic and cultural leaders in establishing new 
enterprises to take Afrikaner businessmen into sectors 
formerly not populated by Afrikaner businessmen. A drive 
to succeed in business, and the aim to address Afrikaner 
poverty and economic marginalisation, allowed the 
proliferation of Afrikaner-controlled enterprises across the 
total spectrum of economic activity. Federale 
Volksbeleggings (FVB) was the financing vehicle. Sanlam 
had a controlling interest in FVB, but did not manage the 
company. The social capital network of managers and 
directors of Sanlam formed the matrix of managerial 
control in the emerging industrial conglomerate. MS Louw 
served on the FVB board and when FVB was established 
it fell upon him to support entrepreneurs and investors 
through the acquisition, rationalisation of management, 
and the streamlining of Afrikaner enterprises to full 
profitability. In 1952 FVB also assisted in establishing a 
mining  house,  Federale   Mynbou   Beperk   (FM).   This  
 
 
 
 
mining house expanded operations from small coal mines 
to the acquisition of the controlling stake in General 
Mining Corporation (Genmin) from the Anglo American 
Corporation (AAC). In FVB a variety of industrial 
companies, financing companies and investment 
companies moved in under the Sanlam network of 
Afrikaner- assisted businesses (Verhoef, 2006; 2009). 
The concern about organisational form that developed 
in Sanlam was simultaneously a performance issue and a 
strategic interest not typically associated with a life office. 
Between 1970 and 1985 the Sanlam Group‟s structure 
became increasingly complex. Sanlam‟s asset base grew 
from R1 000m in 1975 to R6 000m in 1984. FVB and 
Fedmyn expanded into a wide range of industrial and 
mining interests. In the banking sector, Trust Bank, 
established by Jan S Marias, consolidated operations into 
the Bankrop Group. Bankorp‟s assets increased from 
R500m and 2% market share, to R10 555m and 13% 
market share by 1985. Sanlam acquired substantial 
stakes in the Malbak/Protea Group, Natie Kirsch‟s 
Tradegro group, and the Murray and Roberts 
construction group. Substantial losses were made in the 
chemical business Sentrachem, in Kirsch‟s Tradegro 
group, in Nissan, Gencor‟s industrial interests and in 
Sappi. The rumour in the financial press was that Sanlam 
had pumped more than R300m into these companies 
seeking to affect a turnaround. The strategy was 
subsequently to overhaul one of its investment 
companies, URD Investments Pty Ltd. (with only one 
asset, Federale Mynbou Beleggings, holding a 35% stake 
in Fedmyn), into an investment company, Sanlam 
Beleggingskorporasie Beperk (Sankorp Ltd.) (Verhoef, 
2009). The dilemma for Sanlam was that internationally 
the long-term insurance market was changing by the mid-
1980s. Sanlam was constrained in responding to these 
market changes by its extensive investments in non-
insurance business. 
Sanlam slowly progressed from a centralised unitary 
organisational structure (the so-called U form), as 
described by Alfred Chandler Jr, to a diversified 
organisation displaying an M form of organisation. This 
means that functional diversification led to the branching 
out of operations into decentralised business units. 
Sanlam‟s management style and strategic objective 
testified to this. Management was characterised by two 
approaches between 1945 and 1985. The first was the 
direct, hands-on style grounded in centralised control. All 
financial, operational and staff matters were discussed 
and final decisions taken by the Board of Directors. The 
management style remained rigid and bureaucratic. A 
multitude of processes, procedures and rules relating to 
operational and staff matters were introduced. These 
were administered by the same generation of managers 
who had established Sanlam. Only in 1978 did a non-
Sanlam rank-and-file person take up the position of 
Managing Director of the company, namely Dr FJ du 
Plessis. He elevated the position   to   that   of   Executive  
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Chairman in 1982, a role suited to his‟ dominant 
personality. He perpetuated centralised personal control. 
The second approach of more human resources-based 
control emerged later as a clear adjustment in the style of 
management occurred in Sanlam. Central control 
remained unchanged, but acquired a more human face. 
GFS de Villiers, AD Wassenaar and PJF Scholtz, 
exercised central management control through the U 
form of organisation. Board meetings were gradually 
streamlined by organising business along functional 
areas from 1955. In 1958, the minutes of the meetings 
were also streamlined by minuting only decisions and not 
all discussions.  
Wassenaar did not introduce any new strategic 
direction for Sanlam when he succeeded Charlie Louw as 
Chairman. His concern was the stability of the company. 
His business skills and leadership were acknowledged by 
the Harvard Business School, which named him the 
„South African Businessman of the Year‟ in 1968.  From 
1955, a shift from generalists to specialists occurred in 
operations. Various specialists were appointed to develop 
specialist functions in the organisation, such as a public 
relations officer (1955), an English language expert 
(1956), a technical consultant for the purchasing of 
electronic equipment (1958), a legal adviser (1978), and 
art advisers (1978). Delegation and the empowerment of 
a new layer of management signified a limited change in 
management control when Pepler Scholtz assumed 
office. The approach to staff also changed. A report on 
“more effective utilisation of human resources” was 
presented to the board in 1973. In 1980, decisions on 
salary increases to a certain predetermined level were 
gradually delegated to management on different levels of 
operation. In 1983, the decision-making powers for 
investment decisions were also delegated to the 
appropriate level of management (Sanlam Minutes, 1955-
1980). 
It was only since the 1970s that management assumed 
a more strategic role. General Managers dealt with 
functions closer to their areas of expertise. The strategic 
direction of Sanlam was gradually becoming more 
defined under Fred du Plessis as Executive Chairman. 
His vision for Sanlam was a prominent role in the South 
African economy as an Afrikaner business conglomerate. 
This strategy eventually developed into a distinct barrier 
to successful adjustment to industry changes of the late 
1980s. The most significant characteristic of the post-war 
period was the diversification of its investment base, 
which positioned Sanlam across all the sectors of the 
economy. Although not directly engaged in the 
management of the underlying companies, through 
directorships and investments, Sanlam had a distinct 
operational exposure. The operational efficiency of many 
of the „stakeholder‟ companies lagged the market by the 
late 1970s, with shares trading at a notable discount. 
Organisational restructuring was inevitable because of 
the  growing   diversification    of    Sanlam‟s    investment  
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Table 1. Sanlam performance, 1945-1985. 
 
 
Year 
 
Premum 
Income 
£/R since 1961 
% 
Growth 
Assets £ 
Return 
on assets 
Death and 
disability claims 
paid £/R since 1961 
Branches 
Bonus 
rate 
Admin cost 
£/R since 
1961 
1945 1 888 766 29 9 394 751 3.35 215 186 9 2.0 209 961 
1947 2 729 424 44 13 051 675 3.35 286 669 9 2.2.0 352 285 
1949 3 451 377 26.4 17 784 699 3.6 428 412 9 2.2.0 411 551 
1951 4 492 179 30.1 23 898 986 3.81 441 325 10 2.2.0 604 806 
`953 6 053 322 34.7 32 901 535 3.94 633 021 11 2.4.0 887 095 
1955 7 895 133 30.4 43 877 475 4.3 800 188 12 2.7.6 1 105 107 
1957 10 156 622 28.6 57 698 736 4.65 1 239 960 15 2.7.6 1 482 765 
1959 12 237 986 20.4 73 148 133 4.94 1 890 885 18 2.10.0 1 695 695 
1961 29 206 757 19.52 179 684 662 4.97 4 766 000 21 2.5.0 4 420 596 
1963 35 177 460 20.4 219 747 632 5.21 7 633 000 23 2.5 5 300 169 
1965 43 644 000 24.1 270 572 449 5.38 10 404 293 26 2.65 9 576 885 
1967 52 312 406 19.86 334 042 988 5.86 11 237 722 26 2.75 9 995 673 
1969 64 896 980 24.2 421 403 355 6.2 14 853 433 30 27.5 11 981 779 
1971 93 818 000 44.56 528 607 000 6.26 22 692 000 36 31.0 10 000 000 
1973 143 925 000 53.4 701 867 000 6.25 26 909 000 38 31.0 14 000 000 
1975 189 972 000 31.9 973 442 000 7.26 35 979 000 38 31.0 19 000 000 
1977 259 940 000 36.8 1 349 981 000 7.95 49 800 000 43 33.0 22 000 000 
1979 392 124 000 50.8 1 940 442 000 8.00 62 206 000 49 35.0 25 000 000 
1981 644 744 000 64.4 3 072 848 000 9.54 96 318 000 52 37.5 43 000 000 
1983 1 079 303 000 67.4 5 044 560 000 10.7 149 030 000 56 45.5 71 000000 
1985 1 605 000 000 48.7 7 785 000 000 11.20 229 000 000 57 46.5 107 000 000 
 
Source:  Sanlam Annual Financial Statements (1945-1985). 
 
 
 
portfolio. The centralised management structure, had to 
make way for more professional management. Amatori 
and Colli noted: “Out of these changes (development of 
professional management) arose the modern 
multidivisional corporation.”   Diversification was a twofold 
challenge for Sanlam. On the one hand, a population 
experiencing rising living standards, began to demand 
more innovative investment products. This developed as 
a result of innovative and different product offerings. On 
the other hand, the expanding investment activities of 
Sanlam engaged the company increasingly in non-
insurance business operations. This undermined 
performance. Du Plessis therefore abolished the 
management committee in October 1978 to take more 
direct control of „the Sanlam conglomerate‟. In 1984, the 
Board approved the formation of a Group Holding 
Company, acknowledging the functional diversification of 
operations and embarking on the M form of organisation. 
The key management characteristics of Sanlam changed.  
The unitary form (U form) of the past, which was 
embedded in the scientific management theory and 
manifested through strong central managerial control in a 
centralised organisation, developed strain. The classical 
management theory with its emphasis on authority and 
unity of command, direction and the subordination of 
individual interest to that  of  the  collective  entity  (in  this 
case the managers), gradually changed.  The emphasis 
on stability and tenure of staff and the promotion of a 
unity of interest between management and employees, 
could no longer be sustained in the more dynamic 
multidivisional enterprise. The rapidly growing economy 
after the war mandated change in organisational form 
and managerial practice. The bureaucratic and 
administrative management approaches made way for a 
more people-oriented approach. The human relations 
theory found increasing application in the managerial 
style of the Sanlam management. By the 1980s the 
economic changes of South Africa impacted directly on 
the organisational and managerial structure of the 
company. The Peter Senge „learning organisation‟ soon 
manifested in the changes to the organisational structure 
as well as the nature of management in Sanlam. The 
multidivisional organisation mandated diffusion of 
decision-making powers. Top management developed a 
more strategic role as „commanders-in-chief, and directed 
the next level of management, the divisional managers, 
who operated as the „field generals‟.  Du Plessis‟ 
autocratic management style between 1978 and 1989 
temporarily placed a hold on the full manifestation of the 
M form. 
As reflected in Table 1, Sanlam grew consistently up to 
the   mid-1980s,   but   performance    stagnated   equally  
 
 
 
 
consistently afterwards. 
 
 
Context and strategic overhaul: The crucial changes 
for growth 
 
During the last half of the 1980s Du Plessis‟ rule of force 
brought Sanlam to the brink of a strategic cul de sac. 
Industry developments mandated the building down of its 
Afrikaner empowerment empire. It was only after the 
restructuring exercise towards the mid-1990s that the 
focus shifted to financial services as a core function. 
During the period of Du Plessis‟ leadership the relative 
stability of the underlying Sanlam-bred management and 
directors was a supportive factor. The Sanlam 
management displayed long-term stability in the 
succession of leaders who had made their way up the 
ranks in the company. Apart from Fred du Plessis, 
management consisted of second and third generation 
Sanlam managers. In 1985, when Fred du Plessis was 
Chairman and Managing Director, the second 
management rank was Pierre Steyn, George Rudman 
and Johan Söhnge as Senior General Managers. In April 
1985 Pierre Steyn succeeded Du Plessis as Managing 
Director. The latter chaired the board, while AD 
Wassenaar was a member of the board until his 
retirement in February 1986. Wassenaar served Sanlam 
as Honorary President until his death in 1991. Du Plessis 
died suddenly on 14 March 1989, a day before he would 
have delivered the chairman‟s address at the seventieth 
Sanlam annual general meeting. Between March and 
September 1989, Tjaart van der Walt was the Sanlam 
Chairman, succeeded by Dr AJ van den Berg in 
September 1989. Management returned to the Sanlam 
faithful under Steyn (his career started in Sanlam in the 
early 1960s after completing a first degree as a recipient 
of a Sanlam bursary) and then in April 1993 Desmond 
Smith, Senior General Manager: Individual Insurance, 
assumed the position of Managing Director.  
In 1993 Marinus Daling became Chairman of Sanlam, 
and subsequently Executive Chairman in November 
1997.  As head of investments in Sanlam before the 
formation of Sankorp (the investment subsidiary Fred du 
Plessis established in 1985 to address the under-
performance of its so-called strategic investments). 
Daling‟s new executive team comprised Hendrik Bester, 
Managing Director: Asset Management; George Rudman, 
Senior General Manager: Finance; Johann Treurnicht, 
Senior General Manager: Marketing; and Leon Venter, 
Senior General Manager: Business Systems. They 
brought together vast experience as actuaries and 
managers in Sanlam, but the strategist was Daling, the 
relatively young 52-year-old actuary who had managed 
Sanlam‟s investments in Sankorp since 1985. He was a 
close confidant of Fred du Plessis. When Daling 
succeeded Desmond Smith, the senior management 
team members, except for Rudman, were five years 
younger than him. The strategic repositioning  of  Sanlam  
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was in the hands of a young Sanlam generation. The 
board provided backing to a group of people with deep 
and wide economic, strategic and business experience 
and the wisdom to guide transformation of the Sanlam 
business.   
An important expert was the accountant and business 
executive DL Keys, Chairman and former CEO of Gencor 
and a member of the board of Billiton and reinsurance 
companies. In 1991 Keys was appointed Minister of 
Finance in the last Cabinet of FW de Klerk, but he 
resigned in 1994 and returned to the Sanlam board in 
September 1994. Keys had a successful business career 
and worked with the Sanlam management as Chief 
Executive of Gencor. Although he was an Englishman, he 
had close working relationships with Afrikaners 
throughout his professional career and spoke immaculate 
Afrikaans.  
The Afrikaners in management and on the board were 
known to be independent critical thinkers, supportive of 
political change in South Africa, but the extent of the 
consequences of majority black rule was unchartered 
territory. Sanlam‟s management navigated cautiously 
between business sustainability, fundamental changes in 
the long-term insurance market, and the political overhaul 
of South Africa. The board did not drive any path-
breaking strategic or business changes in Sanlam. 
Management and policy direction were dominated by 
Fred du Plessis
1
 (Scheffler, 2009), and after his death it 
was not the directors but management who emerged as 
the agent of change management.  
Fred du Plessis was obsessed with control and after 
the acquisition of union Corporation following an 
unfriendly take-over of Union Corporation during 
1975/1976, Du Plessis battled in public with Rembrandt 
and Volkskas to secure full control of the board of 
Genmin, the new Afrikaner controlled mining hose. 
Rumours were going around that the Sanlam 
management was acting in too interventionist and 
authoritarian a manner at some of its related companies. 
The public Broedertwis shook the confidence in Sanlam 
as a trustworthy life office, investment partner and 
vanguard of Afrikaner economic achievement. In Sanlam 
the acquisition drive of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in 
control of companies operating in diverse business and 
industrial sectors outside of the long-term insurance 
market. Sanlam did not have the expertise to intervene in 
operational management, but was aware of the sub-
optimal performance of these non-core assets. The 
former Managing Director, Pepler Scholtz, a member of 
the Sanlam board in 1983, pointed out that when a 
company controlling a diverse number of operating 
concerns,   was   also   an   operating    company,    more  
                                                          
1Interview Walter Scheffler, 24/02/2009. He describes Fred du Plessis’ 
appointment as a ‘culture shock’ to many in Sanlam, because he had a strong 
personality, strong views and academic demeanour, which often left the 
ordinary Sanlam employee grasping to understand the gist of what he said. He 
did not tolerate opposition.  
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problems arose than were being solved. Scholtz 
identified the conflicting dualism of the interests of the 
controlling company and those of related companies. 
Sanlam as a life office with the responsibility to guarantee 
stable insurance returns and a safe savings opportunity, 
could not guarantee equal access to its investment funds 
by all its related companies and simultaneously look after 
policyholders‟ interests. Scholtz suggested the separation 
of responsibilities between management of a life office 
and management of non-core operating companies. The 
strategic importance of functional separation was 
inevitable.  
Fred du Plessis identified four areas of under-
performance in the Sanlam Group: unsatisfactory 
performance of „related‟ companies; a complete lack of 
coordinated group response to short-term business cycle 
estimates, and these impacted on the long-term 
perceptions of changes in technology, the political 
economy, social behaviour and demographics; 
uncoordinated recruitment and development of human 
resources in the Group; and finally, insufficient attention 
was afforded to the construction of a distinguishable 
group identity to separate Sanlam from other 
conglomerates in South Africa (Sanlam Board minutes, 
15/8/84).  
The management philosophy driving the restructuring 
of Sanlam‟s strategic investments was, what was known 
in management theory of the time, as strategic planning 
companies (SPC) (Goold and Campbell, 1987). Sankorp 
functioned on a lean management structure, primarily 
participating in and influencing the development of 
business strategies in the related companies. „The centre 
must provide the longer-term perspective‟ (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987: 46); a senior manager at a strategic 
planning company claimed: “It is a charade to pretend in 
this era of corporate democracy to decentralize this right 
and responsibility [that is to be involved in strategy 
decisions] widely into the organisation. Down at the 
business level there are two or three decisions each 
decade that make or break business. Do you really want 
to leave the business manager alone to make these
 
(Goold and Campbell, 1987: 47)? Sankorp concentrated 
investment, human resources and strategic planning 
expertise in its own structure in order to assist long-term 
planning from the centre, leaving short-term 
implementation decisions to operational management 
within underlying companies. Du Plessis maintained an 
active presence in the Sankorp planning process. He was 
known for his “... single-minded, purpose leadership and 
clear insight ...” (The Star, 25/2/90), as well as “... clear 
economic vision, his expertise and his refusal to 
compromise his principles” (Pretoria News, 16/3/89). 
When he died in 1989, the response was that, “It says 
much for the management capability of the Sanlam 
Chairman, Fred du Plessis, who died in tragic 
circumstances last week, that his replacements in the 
group‟s  top  echelons  were   so   self-evident”   (Finance  
 
 
 
 
Week, 29/3/89). Du Plessis‟ thinking was that the SPC 
ultimately had to build the leadership throughout the 
group, which, it was believed, would ultimately deliver 
much-improved operational excellence.  
In Sankorp a core of strategic management experts 
addressed those concerns as part of a systematic 
performance overhaul of underlying concerns. What 
Sankorp achieved was to rationalise Sanlam‟s stake 
investments through disposals and investments, the 
unbundling of several conglomerate pyramids, the 
migration from absolute control to significant control of 
underlying companies, the delisting and listing of 
companies, and BEE. These actions added significant 
value, but also established core principles in management 
as a signature Sankorp legacy. These included 
management succession planning, equal opportunities, 
flexible work practice, directors‟ roles as active and 
engaged in the company, social involvement, managing 
the business environment in a situation of structural 
economic and political change, BEE and corporate 
governance (Minutes Sankorp Bord, 22/2/95). The most 
value-adding dimension of Sankorp‟s intervention was 
the close monitoring of the performance of the underlying 
companies and regular reporting to Sanlam in that 
respect. The Sankorp portfolio had a market value of R1 
300 million in 1985, which by 1995 had risen to R21 779 
million, 36.77% annual compound growth. In 1995 alone 
the value added to the Sankorp companies was R3 333 
million, which represented an internal rate of return (IRR) 
of 19.7% compared to the JSE Overall Index of 10.4%. 
Sankorp‟s portfolio performed even better for the 
preceding three years, 1992 to 1995, during which the 
value added was R13 331 million with an IRR of 46.5%, 
while the JSE Overall Index was 27.2%. Ultimately the 
combined stock exchange performance of Sankorp‟s 
portfolio between 1985 and 1995 exceeded the JSE‟s 
overall performance by 18% (Minutes Sankorp Board, 
21/11/96). 
Restoring value in the Sankorp investments comprised 
only one dimension of the Sanlam repositioning. An 
industry shift out of long-term insurance toward 
personalised wealth products, necessitated strategic 
thinking and change management. Management had to 
come to grips with the contracting demand for long-term 
insurance products, understand the new demand for 
wealth products and carve out a new role in the 
dynamically changing financial services industry. It was 
soon apparent that Sanlam under Daling emerged as a 
„learning organisation‟ (Senge, 1990) where leaders 
perceived themselves as part of the evolution of the 
nature of work and organisations. The ability to apply the 
five disciplines of the learning organisation held the key 
to Sanlam‟s industry repositioning. The death of Fred du 
Plessis and the management repositioning under Pierre 
Steyn set in motion a direction that was not at that time 
envisioned to be the beginning of the demutualisation of 
Sanlam. Steyn inherited Sanlam with a yield on assets  of  
Adri and Verhoef           31 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sanlam accumulated surplus and policy liabilities, 1986-1994. 
 
Date 
Accumulated 
surplus (1), R’m 
Total policy 
liabilities (2), R’m 
Policy liabilities (market 
related/linked policies excluded) 
R’m 
1÷2% 1÷3% 
30/09/86 1 402 10 942 4 078 1.,8 34.4 
30/09/87 1 455 17 046 6 044 8.5 24.1 
30/09/88 1 493 19 231 8 007 7.8 18.6 
30/09/89 1 686 29 950 12 097 5.6 13.9 
30/09/90 1 697 34 449 15 117 4.9 11.2 
30/09/91 1 745 47 279 20 961 3.7 8.3 
30/09/92 1 805 56 455 25 881 3.2 7.0 
30/09/92 2 100 67 669 32 076 3.1 6.5 
30/09/94 3 200 86 463 41 531 3.7 7.7 
 
Source:  Sanlam Archives: Sanlam Minutes of Board Meeting (19/04/95). 
 
 
 
just over 10%, while inflation ranged between 14 and 
15%. He called on George Rudman, who was then 
Senior General Manager: Finance and Planning, to find „a 
profit base‟ (winsgrondslag) for Sanlam. The telling 
question was: what is profit in a mutual insurer? Rudman 
consulted with British and American life offices on how to 
manage the „estate‟. The „estate‟ as defined by Rudman 
at that time was the difference between assets and 
policyholder liabilities, that is, the free assets of the 
company (the capital, this was the term used in a mutual 
company for the excess of assets over actuarial liabilities) 
of a mutual insurer. He returned convinced that Sanlam, 
the mutual, had to be managed with a clear view to 
generate profit as the security to the company in times of 
market downturn and extreme volatility. Rudman took a 
visionary position when in January 1990 he appealed for 
a „new‟ approach to the management of policyholder 
funds. He called for a dedicated strategy to seek optimal 
profits on investment, low costs and an equitable 
distribution of risk. He told management that the mutual 
company should no longer be managed as a mutual. Its 
„capital‟ should be considered as an „estate‟, which 
constitutes the capital to be invested to optimise returns 
to profit-sharing policyholders (SA: 5/2/1: Confidential 
memorandum G Rudman – P Steyn, 16/1/1990). 
Rudman understood the need for a radical change in the 
culture of doing life business. Sanlam needed a business 
approach to life business, as markets and client demand 
changed and political volatility increased instability. 
Bringing about such a complete mental shift called for 
patient convincing. Mutuality was part of the Sanlam 
legacy but by the 1990s was no longer the crucial 
motivational mass mobiliser of the beginning of the 
century. Industry changes mandated functional 
adaptation, but management had to prepare policy-
holders for a change.  
Management was also not easily convinced about 
changing its mutuality. Desmond Smith considered Pierre 
Steyn a devout „mutualist‟, but at the time of his passing 
away in December 1993 Smith claimed that management 
was already fairly swayed towards the wisdom of 
demutualisation. To Smith the conservative life assurer, it 
was a matter of striking the right time, both in terms of the 
readiness of Sanlam as well as the market (Interview D K 
S Smith, 5 October 2017). Rudman made submissions to 
the Sanlam board twice, but in both instances he failed to 
convince the board, who represented policyholders‟ 
interests, which were that policyholders‟ interests would 
not be served at that stage by changing the mutual 
character of the company (Minutes Sanlam Board, 
19/4/95, 21/9/94). When Marinus Daling succeeded 
Steyn, in December 1993, it was known to senior 
management that Daling wanted demutualisation of 
Sanlam. The Sanlam institution was not going to change 
easily. Rudman recalled the management summit 
session („bosberaad‟) in April 1994 where discussions on 
mutuality loosely surfaced and Marinus Daling sounded 
Rudman out about the desirable route for Sanlam. 
Rudman remarked that there were no sacred cows as far 
as mutuality was concerned. If it was decided on sound 
business principles that Sanlam should demutualise, then 
„we decide it and do it‟ (Interview Rudman, 14/11/2007). 
However, many more mutuality stalwarts needed 
convincing. A weakening financial situation shifted the 
decision forward. Table 2 reflects Sanlam‟s declining 
surplus by 1993. 
Internal management dynamics and management style 
difference brought Daling on 14 November 1997 to inform 
Desmond Smith that the Human Resources Committee of 
the board had decided that he be relieved of his duties as 
Managing Director. Daling consulted secured agreement 
from the board telephonically and told Smith that  various 
aspects of the weaker performance of Sanlam, including 
the declining CAR during 1997, inefficiency in claim 
processing and the subsequent massive backlog at 
Sanmed (the medical insurer), and unflattering Sanlam 
operating profit and marketing results in 1997, were his 
making.  The  facts  that  Sanlam‟s  operating  profit   had  
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increased consistently since Smith‟s appointment as 
Managing Director in 1993 was not considered, nor were 
the fundamental transformation programmes, 
organisational reforms and introduction of profit centres in 
Sanlam acknowledged. In granting a performance bonus 
to Smith at the end of 1996, Daling indicated that he 
expected Smith to emerge as a stronger leader to map 
out a holistic vision of the direction in which Sanlam was 
moving, and solicit improved performance of all members 
in the management team. This was the only hint that 
Daling considered Smith ill-equipped to secure Sanlam‟s 
demutualisation. The actuarial report for 1997 showed 
that operating profit was up, but was only 86% of budget. 
On the back of that information Daling apparently 
claimed, “I told you so” (Minutes Sanlam Board, 25/2/98; 
Actuarial Report, 31/12/97). Ultimately, Daling‟s personal 
ambition on demutualisation despite Smith‟s cautioning 
that Sanlam was still in a capital-building phase, explains 
his action. Smith left immediately and Daling succeeded 
him as Executive Chairman.
2
  
The focus was fully on driving demutualisation. Smith 
did not suit the Daling re-engineering plan. Timing was of 
the essence. Daling moved away from a past positioning 
strategy and embraced the business process redesign 
approach to strategy as he took agency of the 
developments in Sanlam. It was hinted that slow change 
management might have explained why management 
was not ready to drive the demutualisation process when 
Daling thought the time was ripe, (Confidential 
Communication G Rudman, 30/9/17). But there were 
other reasons why he decided to act swiftly. To Daling 
and Rudman‟s satisfaction, sufficient capital had been 
accumulated to do the transaction. This included the 
acquisition of Gensec.  
The face of Sanlam Ltd was Marinus Daling. At the age 
of 54, with 33 years‟ service in Sanlam, working his way 
up from a platteland Nylstroom boy of the Northern 
Transvaal on a Sanlam bursary at the University of 
Pretoria, his ambition was Sanlam beyond the mutual. 
The confluence of context and business salvage 
convinced Daling at the end of 1997 that he had to act 
decisively. After stepping into the role of Executive Chair 
on 30 November 1998 Daling orchestrated Sanlam‟s 
rescue strategy. The leadership structure of Sanlam Ltd 
was a hand-picked team. Attie du Plessis, who was 
pulled into the demutualisation team, served on the 
executive committee with George Rudman; Flip 
Rademeyer, Financial Director; Hendrik Bester, Head of 
Personal Finance; Nic Christodoulou, Head of Employee 
Benefits; Charl le Roux, Head of Sanlam Health; Anton 
Botha, Head of Gensec; Chris Swanepoel, Chief Actuary;  
                                                          
2SA: Minutes of Sanlam Board, 3/12/1997; Confidential Memorandum DK 
Smith. It was general knowledge among the management team that Smith was 
convinced of the sound decision to demutualise, but that he did not think 
Sanlam was ready to take the step. He was convinced that Sanlam’s capital 
position needed to be on a sound footing as a matter of priority. Sanlam, 
according to Smith, could not afford to demutualise yet. Daling’s ambition did 
not leave room for that. Interview Desmond Smith, 14/6/2017; 10/8/2017. 
 
 
 
 
and Johan Bester, Sanlam Secretary. The Sanlam Ltd. 
board was identical to the board of Sanlam Life. The 
members migrated from the Sanlam pre-demutualisation 
board to the post-demutualisation boards. Daling had 
continuity on the boards and trusted colleagues in the 
Executive Committee (Exco). Members of the Exco 
served on various boards in the Group, thus distributing 
existing executive management of Sanlam throughout the 
Group operations. The Sanlam „trusted‟ or former 
directors, were entrusted with the new Sanlam. Daling 
had to hold the reigns at the centre, since 
demutualisation had changed the organisational form but 
not the inefficiencies or market scepticism. Financial 
fundamentals supported the demutualisation decision. 
Table 3 shows weakened growth in premium income 
during the early 1990s, a weaker relative industry position 
and seriously faltering RoAs. 
Daling wanted to restore operational performance. The 
first step was functional restructuring. He set up separate 
business units in 1999, comprising of Sanlam Personal 
Finance, Sanlam Employee Benefits, Sanlam Health and 
Gensec, as well as a new wholly-owned subsidiary, New 
Business Development. Sanlam controlled 56.9% of 
Santam and 23.7% of ABSA. Structurally, the new 
Sanlam did not differ much from the old. That was the 
challenge of change management in a society that bore 
very little resemblance to the one in which Sanlam 
achieved strong growth during the sixties and seventies. 
The gradual improvement in performance is reflected in 
Table 4. 
Daling could not drive through the changes he 
envisioned for Sanlam. He passed away in February 
2001, leaving a void in performance and leadership. As 
reflected in Table 4, return on embedded value collapsed 
to -9%. Sanlam needed more than the restructuring of 
business units. 
 
 
Strategic intent: Growth and wealth creation 
 
Johan van Zyl was appointed at the helm of Sanlam Ltd. 
in 2003, after a short interlude of an unprecedented weak 
appointment in the person of Leon Vermaak as 
successor of Sanlam. Van Zyl‟s motto was „back to 
basics‟. He set Sanlam on restoring sound performance 
in each of the business units, embracing the changes in 
South African society and politics. His management style 
was to give strong leadership from the centre in terms of 
strategy, but to allow the experts in the different business 
units to implement that strategy where they understood 
the context, business and people best. The fundamentals 
strategic vision was to improve return on capital 
employed. This meant that Sanlam would look where its 
capital was situated, move it to enhance performance 
and secure optimal growth for both shareholders and 
policyholders. 
Step one was to unlock capital in underperforming 
investments.  One  such  investment  was  the   stake   of  
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Table 3. Sanlam selected performance indicators, 1985-1997. 
 
Year 
Premium 
Income Rm 
% growth 
Premium 
As % 
Industry 
Life 
Assurance 
Fund Rm 
Total 
Assets 
Rm 
Asset % 
Industry 
Assets 
RoA 
% 
1985 1 605 - 27.07 7 524 7 785 18.2 11.2 
1986 2 087 23 - 9 316 9 611 19.6 11.19 
1987 3 527 40.8 - 12 269 12 845 21.2 10.28 
1988 5 174 31.8 34.04 16 537 17 213 23.3 10.10 
1989 6 036 14.2 35.13 21 735 22 796 18.7 10.23 
1990 7 428 18.7 34.33 27 254 27 908 19.56 10.71 
1991 8 178 9.17 33.34 50 012 50 786 29.4 6.76 
1992 10 400 21.3 33.3 59 125 60 070 29.3 6.68 
1993 12 798 18.6 33.23 70 568 71 846 29.5 6.29 
1994 13 626 6.14 29.5 99 163 101 380 31.9 5.22 
1995 16 654 18.1 26.9 122 260 124 987 33.8 6.70 
1996 18 618 10.54 25.06 130 400 132 877 29.04 6.22 
1997 21 966 15.2 31.02 136 244 139 817 28.5 8.57 
Annual Compound Growth 
„85-„97 
26.84 - - 30.11 30.02 - - 
 
Source: Sanlam Annual Financial Statements (985-1997); Financial Services Board Annual Reports (1985-1997). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Sanlam performance 1998-2002. 
 
Parameter 1998 2000 2002 
Total Group equity (Rm) 21 952 27 238 27 087 
Total assets (Rm) 17588 178065 18357 
Headline earnings (Rm)* 1 186 2 406 2 127 
Embedded value (EV) per share (cps) 827 1035 1032 
Return on EV % -0% 5.1% -9.2% 
Total issued shares (m) 2 654.5 2 654.5 2 654.5 
Earnings per share (cps)* 58.4 90.6 80.8 
Share price (cents) 585 956 760 
Dividend per share - 30 37 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 1.7 2.4 1.7 
 
Source:  Sanlam Annual Financial statements (1998-2002). 
 
 
 
Sanlam in ABSA. In November 2005 Sanlam disposed of 
its 23% interest in ABSA to Barclays Bank. The 
significance of this transaction was both strategic and 
financial. The cash available changed the business 
landscape of Van Zyl‟s turnaround strategy. This put  
Sanlam in a position to decide on the application of 
„surplus‟ capital in business ventures offering good 
returns and eased the tense relationship with an 
underperforming strategic asset. The legacy of „strategic‟ 
investments from the Fred du Plessis era was finally 
concluded. For the first time since 1973 when Sanlam 
acquired FVB‟s stake in Trust Bank, it no longer had a 
substantial stake (through the voting pool) in a South 
African bank. Management of the structural change in the 
Group suddenly became much easier. The conclusion of 
other strategic initiatives on the restructuring of Gensec 
Bank and the conclusion of a major BEE transaction were 
key components in the „Delivery 2004‟ plan. Sanlam 
Capital Markets (SCM) took control of Gensec Bank‟s 
former capital market operations. The restructuring was 
an integral part of group-wide capital management and 
the strategy to seek significant improvement in 
investment returns. In December 2003 SCM‟s fixed cost 
base was more than half less than that of Gensec Bank, 
while equity capital employed in Gensec amounted to 
R1.6 billion, compared to R400 million in SCM. The 
Gensec ROE (without write-downs, provisions and 
restructuring costs) was 7.7%, while SCM‟s was 21%. 
Write-downs and provisions in Gensec amounted to in 
excess of R465 million. Gensec underperformed the 
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Table 5. Sanlam performance, 2002-2013. 
 
Parameter 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Total Group equity value (Rm) 27 087 36682 46 811 45 238 57 361 75 352 84 409 
Total assets (Rm) 18357 228024 335482 31708 361191 490 953 561 304 
Headline earnings (Rm)* 2 127 3 185 6 838 2 702 5 122 5 763 8 062 
Embedded value (EV) per share (cps) 1 032 1 344 2047 2  213 2 818 3 707 4 121 
Return on EV per share % -9.2 27.7 31 -1.7 18.2 22 17 
Total issued shares (m) 2 654.5 2 767.5 2 303.6 2 190.1 2 100 2 100 2 100 
Headline Earnings per share (cps)* 80.8 116.6 304.9 132.2 252.4 292.1 395 
Share price (cents) 760 1300 1830 1700 2792 4477 5324 
Dividend per share 37 50 77 98 115 215 200 
Sanlam Life Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 1.7 3.7 4.4 2.7 3.4 4.3 4.5 
 
Source:  Sanlam Annual Financial Statements (1998 - 2016). *Introduction of IFRS in 2006 changed accounting policy figures not 
fully comparable to period before 2006. 
 
 
 
investment bank index by more than 4% per annum, 
which translated into a destruction of value to 
shareholders of approximately 12% since the hasty 
acquisition of Gensec. There was no argument about the 
rationale for the intended restructuring. In June 2004 the 
bank licence of Gensec was returned to the Registrar of 
Banks. This action freed up further capital, available for 
better employment in the Group‟s capital management 
programme (Minutes Sanlam Board, 3/12/2003, 
19/4/2004, 2/6/2004).  
After the conclusion of the ABSA transaction and the 
cash-rich Sanlam‟s decision to buy back its shares, a 
notable improvement in market confidence developed. 
The share price rose to well above R12.00 by the end of 
2005 and the discount to EV dropped below 10%. The 
financial analysts were upbeat about the anticipated 
upward trend in the Sanlam share price. That rise 
reflected in the growing proportion of institutional 
shareholders to 60% of Sanlam‟s shareholders in 2006. 
Offshore shareholders made up 24% of Sanlam‟s 
shareholders. Individual shareholders‟ stake in the 
company diminished from 47% shortly after 
demutualisation to 17% in 2006. Expectations 
materialised, since in 2007 the share price rose to around 
R22.75 and traded at only a 3% discount to EV. Overall 
performance of the Group in 2006 pointed to the growth 
strategy gaining sustainable momentum. New business 
volumes exceeded R100 billion, and core earnings R4 
billion for the first time (Sanlam Annual Report, 2007: 
119). The performance reflected a group reaping the 
benefits of a focused business strategy implemented 
since 2003, but the significant development was the 
change in the structure of the business. During 2002 
more than 75% of all new business inflows was 
generated through the life insurance business. In 2007 
new business from the traditional life market declined to 
around 20%, while the performance of innovative private 
investment products rose exponentially. By 2007  Sanlam 
had built the largest private client business in South 
African in Sanlam Private Investments. SPI held assets 
under management of more than R50 billion in 2007, 
reversing a loss-making operation of 2002 to deliver R80 
million pre-tax profit in 2007. Financial services‟ net 
contribution to group results rose by 20%, core earnings 
per share rose by 27%, new business volumes rose by 
26%, the value of new life business rose by 31%, and 
return of Group Equity Value per share rose to 18.8%. As 
reflected in Table 5, by 2013, return on embedded value 
rose consistently, as did the share price, headline 
earnings and CAR. Van Zyl described 2007 as the first 
year in which Sanlam had achieved real growth since the 
early 2000s. He considered the establishment years of 
his back-to-basics strategy as years of “fixing the 
business and developing a wide base”. The foundation of 
the turnaround strategy was improved capital efficiency 
and diversification.  
At the end of a decade of redirecting Sanlam from 
constrained operations facing adverse market conditions, 
capital impairment and uncertain strategic direction, the 
Group emerged in an undisputed growth trajectory at the 
end of 2013. The company celebrated 90 years in the 
South African financial services landscape in 2008. That 
year was only the start of a successful turnaround 
strategy. The Group management strategy successfully 
integrated the managerial and intellectual capabilities of 
the executive team into a consensus corporate strategy 
of aiming for the globe from the firm foundations of local 
roots. Strategically, the Sanlam Group was held together 
by a shared business philosophy that creates a „One 
Firm‟ firm. This philosophy had its roots in an 
entrepreneurial culture with its essence captured in 
traditional values (such as honesty, hard work and ethical 
behaviour), innovation, stakeholder value and strong ties 
with business partners (Minutes Sanlam Board, 
3/12/2012; Sanlam Business Philosophy: November 
2012).  The  Group  made  significant  progress   towards  
 
 
 
 
becoming the leader in client-centric wealth creation, 
management and protection in South Africa, and in 
emerging as a leading player in financial services in 
selected emerging markets of Africa and Asia, and 
specific developed markets. The functional structuring of 
the business of the Sanlam Group into autonomous 
clusters enabled the human capital capabilities in the 
Group to operate within a framework of „tight and loose‟ 
parameters. The decade between 2003 and 2013 
revisited the roots of Sanlam and confirmed those roots 
in negotiating the future of the Group. This was confirmed 
by Van Zyl: “Sanlam‟s history has been a key driver of 
empowerment, economic advancement, wealth creation 
and protection. This is a legacy and a responsibility that 
we take very seriously” (Sanlam. Riding the wave. 
Sanlam’s socio-economic impact in South Africa and 
beyond. Sanlam, 2013).    
 
 
Concluding the case of Sanlam, 1945-2013 
 
Assessing the fundamentally changed context of South 
Africa after 1990, but more so, assessing the 
fundamental overhaul of global insurance market, called 
for strategic vision and understanding of the strategies of 
change management. Sanlam had nurtured good stable 
and responsible managers in its conservative organisation 
since 1918. Management kept strong centrally controlled 
styles of business operations until the dynamics of a 
deregulated global context and new socio-political 
developments in South Africa mandated radical change 
of direction. This radical change did not imply a change in 
the basic business model, but adapting to changes in the 
environment as part of the core insurance and financial 
services business. Sanlam had to bring in new human 
capital, address shifts in consumer demand for risk 
products, deliver much improved returns on investment 
for its new shareholder base, and Sanlam wanted to 
remain in business. The company was on the verge of a 
century of business in South Africa. Management 
innovation through the injection of leadership outside the 
Sanlam ranks was he answer. Fred du Plessis‟ personal 
traits brought him into conflict with the Sanlam stalwarts 
and the public or Sanlam policyholder base. Du Plessis 
was even content with confronting other Afrikaner 
business interests and respected Afrikaner business 
people. He failed to secure the core insurance and 
investment functions of Sanlam as drivers of change and 
enhanced performance. Daling had a sense of the 
contextual challenges, but he only got to effect 
demutualisation. It is important to recognise the in-house 
Sanlam management innovators, such as Rudman and 
Smith, who initiated and drove the demutualisation 
initiative up to the point where the Daling ambition took 
control. Daling was successful in driving demutualisation 
through an unprecedented and somewhat risky 
timeframe.  Demutualisation  was  the  first  step  towards  
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business sustainability. Performance enhancing strategies 
were needed to sustain the business as a going concern. 
Johan van Zyl understood strategy, context and human 
capital. The combination of the three dimensions of 
management, secured Sanlam entry into a next century. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The world in which Sanlam operated after WWII, was a 
dynamically changing one. The post-war recovery fuelled 
by the rapid rebuilding of its main trading partner 
economies in Britain and Europe, expanded the market 
for life assurance and an emerging market for new 
financial services. Superior change management was 
called for as the global business environment opened up 
to deregulation. The termination of the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate system, in 1971, signalled growing 
international competition. At the core of the global 
developments was strategic management to negotiate 
corporations successfully through such change. Sanlam 
management sustained its focus on centralised control of 
its conservative business model until the mid-1980s. The 
implication of these findings for the research gap, is that 
the predominant Afrikaans management team in Sanlam, 
anticipated the fundamental contextual change in south 
Africa and tapped into international management theory 
and best practice to bring about organisational and 
strategic change. African business leadership is 
confronted with similar fundamental contextual changes, 
which suggests a similar demand for open-minded 
management. 
The management structure of Sanlam changed 
continuously during the period under consideration. It 
was adapted to accommodate changes external and 
internal to the organisation. The management principle 
that „structure follows strategy‟ manifested in Sanlam. 
Decisions on organisational changes were based on 
strategic interests or concerns that were well thought 
through and entrenched in the strategy of the 
organisation. Management of Sanlam assumed a more 
strategic role since the early 1970s. Various other 
examples are incorporated in this case study. The 
implications of these structural changes for current 
African business, is management‟s sensitivity to 
consistently changing context.  
The organisational structure or architecture of Sanlam 
consistently related to the management theory applied 
during the period. The concepts of „a diversified 
organisation‟, „decentralised business units‟ and „human 
resources-based control‟, for example, were closely 
adhered to in Sanlam during the 1980s when these 
concepts characterised international management theory 
and practice. Geographical proximity is not a pre-
requisite for adherence to the state of the art 
management. 
Sanlam  is  an  example  of  a  sustainable  business  in  
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operation after 100 years. The most important implication 
is that business organisations in Africa are capable of 
achieving such milestones. The organisation remained 
relevant throughout the complex and turbulent external 
environmental changes and adapted to change as and 
where required for sustainability. The management style, 
leadership, people orientation and strategic thinking led 
to a „change fit‟ and learning organisation capable of 
adapting to context. This secured a century of Sanlam. 
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